As Hitler became more and more visible he began attracting more and more risky attention from the Communist opposition.*  "Indeed," Hitler would later write, "how often in those days were they led in, literally in columns, those supporters of the Red Flag with instructions to smash up everything and put an end to our meetings. And how often was everything touch and go, and only the ruthless determination of our meetings' leaders and the brutal handling by our guards was able again and again to thwart our adversaries intentions."*

Because of the attacks launched against the party by the "Left"* (usually the Red Front), Hitler was forced to take more elaborate precautions to safe guard himself and his meetings. At this time there were about one hundred and fifty ex-service men who belonged to the party who could be relied on occasionally to act as bouncers against "Communist and Social Democrat intruders."*  Because each man had to earn a living they could not be on call all the time. Hitler, therefore, organized them into squads responsible for certain sections of Munich. When a meeting was held in their part of town they were required to be ready on short notice to support Graf, Weber or Maurice in defending Hitler and the meeting.

The squads became known as Ordnentruppe (Order Troops) and their first uniform was little more than a swastika arm band. In August of the following year, Hitler would rename the group Sportabteilung (Sport-Section or SA) so as to disguise their true function. Although many historians contend that the SA was created as a paramilitary group to be used against political rivals, the reverse was the purpose at its creation. As Hitler would later state. "The SA was born in 1920....but I had no ideas concerning paramilitary organizations. I began by creating a service to keep order....It was confined to that."* (Later as the party became more powerful and the ranks of the SA grew, the squads would be used to protect NAZI outdoor activities and also "storm" the meetings of Communist and other rivals who used to threaten Hitler meetings. The SA would then come to stand for Sturm-Abteilung (Storm-Section). "Terror will be smashed by terror," Hitler would later tell an acquaintance, "I learned that principle in the street battles between the SA and the Red Front."*)

In 1920, most people had no qualms with Hitler's Order Troops beating up on Communists, Social Democrats or "Marxist Jews" who had come to disrupt his meetings. But, when it was reported that the Order Troops were also beating up on "harmless" Jews, Hitler used the occasion to bar all Jews from attending any future meetings. "Jews only go to the meetings," Hitler would state, "in order to provoke trouble, and thus try to portray the party as a brutal rapist of 'harmless' participants."*  In one of his speeches shortly after, Hitler voiced the same opinion and a few nationalists in the audience shouted out that "Negroes" should also be banned. Hitler shouted back: "I would rather have one hundred Negroes in the hall than one Jew."*  The audience erupted into applause. All future advertisements for party meetings would carry the notation: "Jews not admitted."*  Opposition groups and newspapers, already incensed over Hitler's swastika flag, saw grave undertones in Hitler's proclamation. Rumors began circulating as to the extent of his "anti-Semitism." Hitler was unmoved and considered his proclamation to be a positive act. Opposition only fed his growing anti-Semitism.

The party was now holding a public meeting in Munich nearly every week, and Hitler was the featured or supporting speaker at over 60% of the meetings.*  When Hitler was not speaking in Munich he was normally out of town giving speeches at the four other locals the party had established by this time. His ability as a nationalist speaker became sought after and he was also paid, in a private capacity, by various veteran or nationalistic groups to deliver his message. Drexler, Eckart, Feder or invited outsiders were normally the main attraction at party functions when Hitler was not scheduled.

With the exception of Eckart, Hitler felt that most of those who spoke for the party were tiresome "preachers" who failed to arouse the people. He understood that if the party was to continue to grow, he could not do it all on his own. Speakers like himself, capable of "moving the crowd," as he put it, would have to be found.

As the party's propaganda Chief, Hitler began coaching a few men who he felt showed promise. One of these was twenty year old Hermann Esser who had joined the party around the same time as Hitler. The son of a railroad official, Esser had been a "press secretary" for the army propaganda group Hitler had joined after the war and Esser now wrote for various newspapers and magazines. His writings, normally attacks against Jews and liberals (he harbored ideas of hanging the bourgeoisie)* were capable of rising the eyebrows of even the most staunch nationalists. Esser, as well as the other early followers of Hitler, would later become known as "those Bavarian vulgarians" by newer members of Hitler's circle.*  Next to Hitler, however, Esser was the only other effective speaker in the party capable of appealing to the lower classes. Some of his speeches however, were of such a "primitive" nature that even Hitler found him embarrassing at times.*  Esser however, was intelligent, persuasive, and had a gift for reaching the younger lower class workers that Hitler never truly reached down to. Handsome and sophisticated looking, Esser could have passed himself off as a romantic film star. A great lady's man* he often boasted of his ability to live off his mistresses.*   Esser become part of Hitler's inner circle and would shortly become one of the party's main speakers--second only to Hitler.

In October of 1920 Hitler could take satisfaction in his year with the party. He had raised the small group of six part-time debaters to a party with over a thousand dedicated dues paying members and tens of thousands of sympathizers. Hitler's effect was now becoming felt and when he returned to Austria on a speaking tour (including a stop at Braunau where he was born), it was he and not Drexler that drew the attention. After a speech in Vienna, a newspaper for the working classes wrote that Hitler spoke for two hours but the audience "could have listened to him for days."*  When he got back to Munich, Hitler held a mass meeting at the Kindl Keller, a beer garden and eating establishment, which had the largest  single feast hall in Munich. He nearly packed the place with 3500 people.

Rohm, Hess, Eckart and Scheubner-Richter made certain that Hitler's achievements did not go unnoticed by military and government leaders who now began to take serious notice. Hitler however, had not as yet linked himself with a prominent personality (or group) that would give him the credibility he sought. (As one of Hitler's friends later remarked: "There was still no room for self-made men in the Germany of those days and Hitler's fight against this attitude was to take him years.")*  Such a link would not only open the doors to respectability but large sums of money. In Germany, at the time, the real big money for political purposes did not come so much from individuals, but from large associations of big industrialists, employers and bankers*  who considered it beneficial to establish links with any group or individual which might become politically powerful.*) Hitler did not have long to wait. He was about to receive some unexpected assistance from Moscow--the "worker's paradise."

In the early Fall of 1920, Grigor Zinoviev, president of the Communist International, met with the leaders of the German Independent Socialist Party ninety miles outside of Berlin. Zinoviev had been sent by Lenin and Trotsky to get the Independent Socialists to join with Moscow and ferment revolution throughout Germany. The ranks of the Independent Socialists were composed primarily of workers which Moscow believed held the key to revolution--the strike.

Lenin and Trotsky regarded strikes as a weapon to be used against all non-Communist governments. A continuous wave of strikes would disrupt Germany's system of industrial production and deepen the nation's economic crisis. The brutal breakup of strikes by the Free Corps and other forces did not deter Moscow which viewed any strike, even the hopeless ones, as a victory. That men lost their jobs, were put in jail, or ended up dead meant nothing. Continual waves of even minor strikes, which heaped additional hardships upon the lower classes, would lead to upsurges of popular discontent. Every strike, no matter how it ended was seen as a political triumph or training for civil war. With enough strikes the rift between the lower and upper classes would deepen and the influence of the present "false leaders" would be destroyed. Then, Lenin and Trotsky believed, the victory of a Communist takeover would be assured.*

Zinoviev's appeal to the Independent Socialist fell on receptive ears and he was embraced enthusiastically. Most Communists decided to come out of the closet and over 60% of the 393 delegates voted to join with Moscow. For various reasons the remaining delegates walked out, but the Communists picked up over a half a million new converts in one meeting. It appeared to many that it would be only a matter of time before Moscow dominated, to one degree or another, over Germany.

General Ludendorff, hero of W.W.I, a fierce anti-communist and the symbol to all patriotic and nationalist groups, was convinced that there was not a single political party in Germany which could turn the tide of communist growth. He believed that a new nationalist party had to be found which could appeal to the millions of nationalistic minded ex-soldiers who were now part of the working class.

After the failed Kapp Putsch, Ludendorff had fled northern Germany for Munich. He did not fail to notice that throughout Germany all of the conservative politicians were failing to establish any contact with the ex-soldiers and ordinary people. Hitler, on the other hand, was not only attracting ordinary people, but was "clearly succeeding in presenting a non-Communist program."*

Ludendorff was closely associated with Scheubner-Richter* and the important contact between Hitler and Ludendorff was established.*  The plan that Ludendorff revealed to Hitler was simple. Five months after the Kapp Putsch and the last communist revolt, the Weimar Republic in Berlin disbanded the Free Corps again. Bavaria, consequently, had become home to thousands of ex-Free Corps troops who had poured into the various Bavarian militias and private armies which now numbered 300,000 men. Their ranks were made up for the most part of ex-soldiers, but also disgruntled idealists, nationalists revolutionaries, and disillusioned socialists. They were united in their hatred of the communists and in their determination to overthrow the existing government in Berlin which they referred to, like millions of other Germans, as the "Jews' Republic."*  (By 1922 the reference to the Weimar Republic as the "Jews' Republic" or "Jew Republic" became so commonplace that a "Law (for the Defense of the Republic)" was actually passed making it an offense punishable by a stiff prison sentence. There were also "serious prison sentences" for anyone referring to the President as a "brothel-keeper" or the Republic's flag as "a filthy rag."*)  The inept Weimar government, and the Allies, had demanded that these para-military groups be disbanded, but the Kahr government in Bavaria considered them a "Civil Guard" against the Left and refused. Ludendorff's idea, therefore, was to unite all of the nationalist groups in Bavaria using Hitler's party as a core on which to build an even larger following. Ludendorff would then take over the military leadership with Hitler as political head.*

A few days after Moscow had captured the majority of the Independent Socialists, Ludendorff brought Hitler, dressed in his old blue suit, to meet with Gregor Strasser at Landshut forty miles NE of Munich. Strasser had a small but vigorous following, including his own Free Corps-type army with infantry, artillery and machine gun companies. A twenty-eight year old pharmacist and former soldier, Strasser, like Hitler, had performed heroically during the war and had also won the Iron Cross First Class. Opposed to both communism and capitalism, Strasser sought a "German type" of socialism free of foreign interference. Most of his followers were like himself, nationalistic ex-military men from the trenches who desired a form of government based on the wartime comradeship of brotherhood and patriotism. Although many among the upper classes laughed as such ideas, Strasser spoke for many of the ex-servicemen who now made up a substantial part of the civilian population. Ludendorff revealed his plans to Strasser while Hitler promised to make him the first "national" party district leader of the NAZI party. Strasser was not particularly impressed with Hitler (nor was his brother Otto who found Hitler too "servile" toward Ludendorff who Hitler repeatedly addressed as "your excellency") but he had great "trust" in Ludendorff and made up his mind to join Hitler's party before the day was over.

Hitler had accomplished what only a year before seemed impossible. He had not only linked himself to one of Germany's most revered men among upper military, nationalist and conservative circles, but also a group whose leader, Strasser, was highly respected among lower circles.

By December the party had established ten locals in different Bavarian towns and could boast of over 2,000 dues paying members.*  The membership numbers, however, veiled the true strength of Hitler and the NAZI party. As an example, Strasser (like other group leaders) may have joined the party, but his followers were under no obligation to do so. This was especially the case with the members of the para-military ranks which normally functioned as fairly independent groups. The NAZI party consequently, would primarily continue to consist of members of the lower middle class with para-military (SA) members normally accounting for only 10 to 15% of party strength. But, because of Hitler's links with "Civil Guard" organizations, his influence was far reaching and he would shortly be in a position to call on thousands of ex-soldiers and Free Corps troops who were never members of his party.

In Bavaria, there were about twenty right-wing organization and their "newspaper of record,"* so to speak, was the Volkischer Beobachter (German-People's Observer). (Because of the difficulties of translating volkisch, some publications use "Racial," others "National" in the place of Volkischer. Both terms, as with the one used, (German-People's) are "inadequate, but suggestive.") Because Ludendorff had made Hitler responsible for the "political training" of the groups which were expected to be associated with his party, Hitler wanted to buy the newspaper. The Observer was located on Thiersch Strasse, only two blocks from his apartment and had been up for sale for months.

Anti-Marxist and anti-Jewish to the extreme, the Observer appeared twice a week and had a subscription of about 7,000 with an additional 4,000 through street-sellers and newsstand sales.*  With 250,000 marks of debt against it, the paper was on the verge of bankruptcy. The sale price was 120,000 marks, in full, which equaled the yearly wages of nine average Germans.*  The Army gave Hitler a "loan" of 60,000 marks (which was never repaid) and Eckart raised the remainder, most of which came from an industrialist who had links with the army. The Ludendorff connection was paying dividends undreamed of just weeks before.

As Propaganda Chief, the paper fell completely under Hitler's control and he replaced the old management with members of his inner circle. Hermann Esser was made the First Editor and he and Hitler retained the paper's hate peddling, anti-Left, fanatical style as an opposition to Marx's hate peddling Manifesto and current hate peddling anti-Right publications. As 1920 drew to an end, Hitler and his friends took up the pen (for which each received a small salary) and spewed out their own version of events.

As with his speeches, Hitler also took his writing seriously. During this period (1919-1921) he borrowed over 100 books and pamphlets from one source alone. As any public speaker or writer quickly learns; when you start speaking or writing to thousands of people, your "facts" better have a sound foundation. Some of the books Hitler read (or skimmed-through) during this period were: Luther and the Jews, Schopenhauer and the Jews, Wagner and the Jews, Henry Ford's The International Jew, Bolshevism and Jewry, also books on medieval and modern Germany, Church history, the Talmud, Montesquieu (a political philosopher) and Rousseau (philosopher and composer).*

Hitler's articles, like those in the Communist press, appealed to emotion and were merciless against opponents. Leftists often called on boycotts of the paper and its street sellers were often beaten up.*  When Hitler was later criticized for his journalistic talents, he asked what someone would say about an advertisement that was intended to promote a new soap but also described competing soaps as good. The crowd, Hitler insisted, could only be won over by a "ruthless and fanatical one-sided orientation" and not by "a so-called objective viewpoint."*

The huge debt that came with the paper would burden party finances for years. With the expert guidance of Max Amann, and by exhorting members to subscribe and encouraging them to solicit subscribers, Hitler would finally turn the paper into a profitable venture. The experience filled a void in Hitler's knowledge that would later pay huge dividends. As he would later say: “I would understand nothing about business methods if it had not been, thankfully, for the constant worries about the Party press."* ("Hitler...anticipated modern economic policy,"* and when he came to power (1933) his knowledge of "business methods" turned a bankrupt nation into a respected economic power in three years while most nations languished in the world wide "Great Depression.")

As 1921 began, Hitler felt that it was time for the party to begin to do more than "just talk." He knew that most ordinary Germans were "full of disgust and revulsion" because of the "cowardice"* displayed by the middle-class parties who refused to take a stand against unpopular causes and endeavors. Although Hitler had no direct control over Strasser's Free Corps, or any of the other para-military groups at this time, his association with them was enough to give him the courage to set the party on a revolutionary course. Hitler understood, even in these early days, that one had to have some control of the streets since that is where the "reporters" where. In the first week of January he gave a speech at the Kindl Keller to two thousand enthusiastic listeners and promised that in the future the party would "ruthlessly prevent--by force, if necessary--all meetings and lectures intended to have an undermining effect on our already sick fellow Germans."*

Hitler was in no position at this early stage to carry out his threat against any political party, but he understood that threats in themselves produced effects. The Left had, on more than one occasion, been responsible for the police informing Hitler, "in writing,"* to cancel his meetings because of "possible violence." Hitler hoped that his threats would have the same affect on his adversaries until his party was strong enough to take the threatened action. The ordinary citizens of Bavaria knew the tactics of the Left and were pleased to hear of a nationalist politician who was not only willing to fight back but take the offensive. In the meantime, Hitler satisfied himself with having the SA section of his party disrupt or picket controversial plays and performances* that the majority of Germans found offensive. After a few NAZI demonstrations and "minor" brawls,* Hitler undoubtedly took great satisfaction when later, even the threat of a protest from his group, was enough to cause the Munich police to close down, under the guise of preventing "possible violence," performances that the majority of people found offensive.*  Hitler's action had a positive effect among the majority of Bavarians who had heard of him, and did much to enhance his popularity in Munich. Shortly after, the Allies handed Hitler an issue that would send his popularity soaring.

Because of Allied policy, the winter of 1920-21 was severe with large segments of the German working population going hungry. Food riots erupted and soon spread throughout Germany. Public indignation reached the boiling point at the end of January when the Allies forced on Germany a new "reasonable" formula for paying her war debts. Besides staggering annual fixed payments which threatened to bankrupt the nation, Germany was also expected to hand over to the Allies 12 percent of her exports for the next forty-two years. Such reparations would not only aggravate the already horrid plight of the working classes but would also create hardships for volatile members of the middle class.

In Munich the "great parties," ignored the Allied ultimatum.*  The conservative, center and liberal parties believed that to refuse payment would give France the excuse it was looking for to invade Germany, while the Communists, even though their worker members would bear the brunt of the reparations, supported any Allied demand that created discontent. The nationalist parties, on the other hand, were outraged. A "Workers' Community" of "'folkish associations,'" Hitler wrote, decided to have a combined "demonstration of protest."*

The nationalist coalition first considered holding their demonstration on the Konigsplatz, but the wide open space was too difficult to defend and the idea was called off because of fear it would be "broken up by the Reds."*  The coalition next proposed holding their demonstration in front of the Feldherrnhalle (which was protected by buildings on three sides) but this idea was also abandoned. They finally decided to hold their protest indoors at the Kindl Keller but wavered as to the exact date. Hitler, no doubt sensing that public indignation was high, would later write. "I decided to carry out the demonstration of protest on my own."*

At noon, on Wednesday, February 2, Hitler reserved the largest auditorium in Munich, the Zirkus Krone. The building, located north-west of Munich's main railroad station, sprawled over an entire block. The central arena was capable of holding 9000 people. Hitler quickly had posters printed, announcing the meeting for the next day; "Thursday, February 3, 1921, at 9 p.m." Never before had the party attempted to attract such a large audience, and never before on such short notice.

Party members were shocked at Hitler's audacity and knew that the action could set the party back by years if the gamble failed. Two thousand people jammed into the Hofbrauhaus, or three thousand in the Kindl Keller gave an image of a huge crowd. But, in the Zirkus, they would seem insignificant and the Party might lose its credibility. Party members, as well as Hitler, also worried that the Order Troops, which consisted of no more than 250 men at this time, would not be able to protect such a large hall. (Even as late as the summer of 1922, there were only around 400 SA men.*)  By evening, nevertheless, some of the posters were already going up around town and Hitler was confident that his posters would bring success.

The poster headlines proclaimed that "with diabolic cunning" the Allies had perpetrated a "swindle of honesty" on the German people and now, after two years, were going to "rape" them. "We, to, are human beings and not dogs," proclaimed another headline, "there is no place for negotiations." Hitler then invited all Germans--"manual and white collar workers, laborers and students, officials and employees"--to attend his meeting so as to show German politicians that if they agree to the Allied terms they would lose their jobs. For "1 Mark," the poster proclaimed, those that attended would hear "Herr Adolf Hitler" speak on "FUTURE [PROSPECTS] OR DECLINE."*

By the next morning Hitler's optimism had waned. Bad weather had moved into Munich and Hitler worried "whether under such circumstance many people would not prefer to stay at home instead of going to a meeting in rain and sleet where it was possible that assault and murder would take place."*  Determined not to be "disgraced in the eyes of the Workers' Community,"* Hitler decided to adopt a few more tactics used by the Marxists.

Hitler hurriedly dictated some leaflets and had about 20,000 printed. He then rented two trucks and had them draped in as much red material as possible. The party possessed about fifteen large swastika flags at this time and Hitler had them mounted on the two trucks. That afternoon, each truck was loaded with fifteen to twenty men who were given instructions to drive through the streets, shouting slogans and catchwords while throwing the leaflets from the trucks. "It was the first time that flag-adorned trucks on which no Marxists were found, where driven through the streets of town," Hitler would later write. The upper classes "gaped" at the trucks, Hitler stated, while the "Marxists" raised their fists in anger as though they were "the sole owners of this monopoly."*

Hitler knew that his daring tactics would outrage the Communists and become the talk of the town within hours. With enough public attention, a sufficient number of people might be persuaded to attend his meeting. Even with the bad weather, the one thing Hitler had going for him was that all of Munich's trolleys stopped at the Hauptbahnhof (the main rail station) and the Zirkus was only three blocks up Mars Strasse.

For most of the day Hitler sat nervously at party headquarters. Starting around seven in the evening he was kept informed, by telephone every ten minutes, as to what kind of a crowd was entering the Zirkus Krone. At 7:45 he left party headquarters and was driven to the Zirkus. He would later write:

Two minutes past eight, I arrived in front of the circus....Upon entering the enormous hall I was seized with the same joy as a year previously on the occasion of the first meeting in the Munich Hofbrauhaus. But only after I had pushed my way through the walls of people and had reached the high stage, I saw the success in all its greatness. Like a gigantic shell the hall lay before my eyes, filled with thousands and thousands of people. Even the arena was black with crowds. More than five thousand six hundred tickets had been issued, and if one included the entire number of unemployed, of poor students and our supervising troops, about six and a half thousand people may have been present.*

This was Hitler's first truly mass meeting and the audience for the most part consisted of members of the lower middle class.*  The majority of the men, wearing suits and ties, represented the small-shopkeeper or concierge class. (As an example, Hitler's former landlord, Mr. Popp, joined the party and began attending meetings around this time.) There was also a scattering of former army officers, minor-civil servants, young people, and skilled workers.*  Women, many wearing the latest fashion in hats, accounted for about one in five of those in attendance.

Hitler's ability to appeal to women at this time in German politics was noteworthy. One woman would join the party without ever having hear a Hitler speech. The positive air of the party's members, that she saw in the streets, was enough to win her over.*  One of every seven members of the party were women and they contributed more generously per capita than the men.*  Women also played a very active part. As Hitler would later state: "The Communist and ourselves were the only parties that had women in their ranks who shrank from nothing."*

The meeting got underway and Drexler introduced Hitler to the audience. Within minutes Hitler began to establish a "connection" between his listeners and himself. Any possibility of Red violence was also quickly put to rest. Hitler observed that in an enormous coliseum it "was actually easier to overpower a group of disturbers than was the case in tightly crowded halls."*  Within a half hour of beginning his speech, Hitler had the absolute attention of the audience.

"Someone who does not understand the intrinsically feminine character of the masses," Hitler once said, "will never be an effective speaker."*   Hitler consequently worked his audience as though it was a woman. "Only he who harbors 'passion' in himself can arouse 'passion,'"*  Hitler stated, and on this night he was at his best. As one women stated after a similar speech. "The erotic character, not only of the words but also the accompanying gestures, was unmistakable."*

Within an hour Hitler had complete control over his listeners. Like a great lover, he raised their emotional level to the point where they rejoiced, he wrote, "in ever greater spontaneous outbursts." He then let the passion "ebb" until nothing but the sound of heavy "breathing" filled the void. Nearing the end of his two and a half hour performance, Hitler raised their passions to the bursting point. When he spoke the last word, the "connection" between him and the audience was one and they erupted with joy. Before the passion subsided someone started leading the audience in singing the national anthem. Only them, Hitler wrote, did the audience find its "relaxing conclusion."*

A professor who attended the meeting found that Hitler "controlled the many-thousand-headed audience completely." Although he would have a change of heart later, he found it strange that ordinary people could be "enthusiastic about nationalism" and be opposed to "democratic and socialist dreams."** 

The professor, like many educated people, could not understand that ordinary people need to attach themselves to something they know, trust and believe in. Like the Jews who experienced thousands of years of persecution, when it would have been easy for them to set aside their beliefs and except a new and progressive philosophy, the Germans were not willing to have a new philosophy forced on them. They had always distrusted the West, and their hostility toward western ideas of enlightenment and civilization were drawn out by Hitler. Like the Jews also, "the Germans preferred to retain their loyalties to the past and resisted accommodation of their customs and folkways....[and with Hitler's help] they romanticized the values and ideas of their remote past."*  As one educated German of a different persuasion than the professor stated: "I felt that everything which was old and reminded me of the old days was good and the new things which did not fit into that conception were bad."*

The huge success of the meeting launched Hitler into the limelight. The party had truly broken the bonds of an insignificant group and as Hitler later wrote: "We could no longer be ignored."*

Hitler now began holding meetings in Munich about every five days. Whether at the Hofbrauhaus, the Kindl Keller or the Zirkus, the place was usually packed. Hitler also began holding meetings at the Burgerbrau Keller on Rosenheimer Strasse near the Platz, "an eminently respectable beer hall much frequented by a better class of people."*

On March 6, 1921, at 10 o'clock on a Sunday morning Hitler held another meeting at the Zirkus Krone. Eight thousand people paid a mark to hear him speak. It was the largest gathering he had drawn up till that time.

The day after Hitler's largest mass meeting, the French ignited the flames of nationalism throughout Germany. Still looking for an excuse to fulfill their pre-war dreams, the French army began the occupation of three north German cities east of the Rhine. The action was made under the guise that Germany had failed to deliver reparations payments, but was in reality a preliminary move to occupy Germany's industrial heartland, the Ruhr. Even in Bavaria, which by now was at serious odds with north Germany, Hitler was still able to draw 5000 paying men and women into the Zirkus a week later to protest against France's "'breach of the Peace Treaty'" and the "NATIONAL CRIMINALS" who were selling out Germany "in doglike submissiveness."*

At the end of the month the Allies fanned the flames of German nationalism again. The long awaited plebiscite in Upper Silesia was held with the majority in favor of remaining with Germany. The Allies appointed their own "Commission" which began looking for loop holes to deny Germany as much as possible. In April Hitler was able to pack the Hofbrauhaus, and "educate," as he saw it, his "fellow citizens" as to how they were being robbed of their "freedom." In a speech, on April 9, 1921, he accurately predicted that the Allies would ignore the Treaty and the coal producing areas of Upper Silesia would be lost to Germany. "GERMANY AWAKE" proclaimed his poster.*

For the next four weeks Hitler turned his attention to attracting the "thinking" Red worker. His posters, advertising upcoming meetings, proclaimed that the worker's dream of a "Dictatorship of the Proletarian" had been supplanted by a "capitalist constitution." He blamed the Jews for the "fraud" and asked the workers to "recognize the Jewish democratic swindle." Still determined to drive a wedge between the Marxist leaders and the workers, his poster proclaimed that "a workers movement has to keep itself free from Jews and capitalists," His posters stated that only the "national Socialist movement of Greater Germany" could give the workers what they wanted. Hitler also appealed to the German "youth," especially students, and welcomed them to his meetings. Four-thousand-eight-hundred people, attended one of the meetings.*

By now the military, para-military, and the lower middle classes in Bavaria looked upon Hitler with favor. He was also beginning to make noticeable inroads among the workers. As he proved himself increasing successful, the government in Munich felt it could no longer ignore him. Rudolf Hess, whose Bavarian family was known to minister president von Kahr, established the important connection. On May 14, shortly after Hitler's thirty-second birthday, Kahr received Hess, Drexler and Hitler. Although Kahr was not particularly impressed with the "Austrian," he felt Hitler could be used as a propagandist in Bavaria's struggle with the Weimar regime. The reception gave notice that Hitler was becoming a respectable political force.

Hitler began receiving support from the police president and the head of the departments Political Division. They did what they could to suppress complaints against the Party and promote its expansion. "We did do that," a spokesperson would later testify, "...because we were convinced from the start that this movement was the one most likely to take root among the workers infected with the Marxist plague and win them back into the nationalist camp. That is why we held our protecting hands over the National Socialist Party and Herr Hitler."*

With his sudden jump up the social ladder, more important doors began to open to Hitler and he began to move among circles far more influential than any that the old party committee members provided. There were many among the upper crust however, who were repulsed by Hitler. They sneered at his place of residence, his clothing, his vocabulary and his background. Hitler was aware, from the beginning, what the upper crust thought of him and he had nothing but "contempt" for them.*  He knew that from their point of view he lacked those "outward qualifications" of formal education and family background which mean so much to them.*   He scorned their pretentious ways and phony airs and stated: "Hasn't everyone in this land sprung from the peasantry."*

In order to compensate for Hitler's background, Hess wrote a letter to Kahr shortly after their reception in an attempt to enhance Hitler's position and background. In part he wrote:

The central point is that [Hitler] is convinced that a recovery is possible only if it proves possible to lead the masses, particularly the workers, back to the nationalist cause....I know Herr Hitler very well personally and am quite close to him. He has a rarely honorable, pure character, full of profound kindness, is religious, a good Catholic. His one goal is the welfare of his country. For this he is sacrificing himself in the most selfless fashion.*

Hess then gave an account of Hitler's war record and stated: "Your Excellency can unconditionally trust Hitler."*

Hess was stretching things when he referred to Hitler as a good Catholic. Hitler privately criticized the church (especially the Jesuits) and the Pope more than he praised them. However, he openly scorned the Bavarian separatist movement (with its religious overtones) which undoubtedly appealed to Kahr. Shortly after, Kahr mentioned Hitler "in terms of praise" in the Bavarian congress.*

The praise bestowed upon Hitler had the effect of opening a few more heavy doors, but Hitler hated the idea of having to put himself in a "subordinate" position when dealing with the bourgeoisie.*  He knew that their main objective was to use him and the thought embittered him.*  "The elite," Hitler would later groan, "whatever they do is a result of calculation. Some of them see me as an attraction to their drawing-rooms, others seek various advantages."*   He nevertheless was learning what any aspiring politician in a Republic must accept--hobnobbing with members of the upper crust, however regretful, is the only way to power--no revolution has ever occurred strictly from the bottom up. Hitler would later excuse his association with such people by stating: "The bourgeois with whom we flirted at the time of our struggle were simply aesthetes."*

By the Summer of 1921 Hitler had turned the Party into a fairly respectable right wing force. Since he was the driving force behind the party he ran it as he pleased. The six members of the executive committee, including Drexler, were resentful. Thrust into the background they became dissatisfied with the direction the party was going. They knew that Hitler was intent on embarking on a more radical revolutionary course which they had no taste for. Drexler's highest ambition was a seat in congress and, like the rest of the Committee, he wished to project the image of a mainstream nationalist party so as to further his own ambitions. Drexler had made an attempt to get Hitler to listen to the Committee, but Hitler ignored them. Fearful of Hitler's strong personal following, the Committee began plotting to weaken his position.

Hitler's legitimate position within the party was not one of strength. He had abandoned his place on the executive committee and the only position he held was that of Propaganda Chief. It was Hitler however, who found the party funds, who brought in new members, who wrote the party propaganda, who designed the party regalia, who brought the party its publicity, and who had a hand in every other branch of party activities. His name and the party had become inseparable. The Committee had to be careful not to overstep themselves. Hitler could call for a vote of the membership, and since Germans normally voted for "lists" of candidates, Hitler and his inner circle might oust them. If the vote went against Hitler, however unlikely, he might just take his followers with him and start his own party. Whatever the outcome, the Committee knew that without Hitler, they would end up in the back rooms where they started. They consequently did not have the courage to attempt to get rid of Hitler, but were intent on using him to further their ambitions.

To assure their positions and recapture the direction of a much enhanced party, the Committee had offered Hitler the position of "First Chairman," but with Drexler as "coadjutor in the executive committee."*  Hitler knew that the old democratic principle of six against one would prevail and ignored the offer. Undaunted the Committee embarked on another scheme.

Since Hitler's association with Ludendorff, negotiations aimed at consolidation had been going on between the Party and other right wing organizations. Hitler insisted that the other groups dissolve and/or their members join his party on an individual basis. Outside of Munich a few small groups had been induced to abandoned their party platforms and, like Strasser, become locals of Hitler's National Socialists. With its acquisition of individuals and groups, the party had acquired certain "officers and men of academic education," the "so-called fine people" of the movement, who secretly despised Hitler "for his lack of higher education"* and background. They began conspiring with the Committee members to attempt a merger with a rival nationalist group. A merger, they felt, would curb Hitler's freedom of action,* while still giving them the advantage of using him for their own purposes. The Committee, consequently, began talks with the German Socialist Party (Deutsch-Sozialistische Partei).

The German Socialist Party had been founded in north Germany shortly after the war and was larger than Hitler's Party which confined its activities primarily to Bavaria. The German Socialists had thirty-five locals throughout Germany, including one in Munich.*   Because the ideas and goals of the German Socialist leaders were similar to Hitler's, the Committee, and the quality people associated with them, were ecstatic over the possibilities. If a merger was concluded, the main office of the combined group would shortly be shifted to Berlin. All of the locals, along with the Munich group, would be answerable to Berlin. Hitler, the undisputed best speaker, would most likely be kicked upstairs to become a main speaker for the combined party. The Committee members in Munich would then recapture their prominent positions. Certain that Hitler would not pass up the chance to find a nationwide audience, the Committee notified him of their plan.

Hitler was not enthusiastic. A merger called for concessions which would threaten his platform and also jeopardize his fragile leadership role. He knew that with a merger the "western," as he called it, democratic concept of debate and compromise would prevail. He would also have to fight his way up the ranks of an already established pecking order in an attempt to find a place at the top. He had the perception (which is something he had in abundance)* to know that the academic and quality people within the combined movement would never let him enter the higher ranks. Like the great  "rabble rousers" of the French and American revolutions (who were used so successfully and then quickly forgotten), Hitler knew that he would only be used to further the ambitions of "people of quality."  Hitler demanded that all talks of merger be stopped. When the Committee balked, Hitler threatened to resign. The committee now faced a dilemma. If Hitler resigned and took the party faithful with him, there would be little to negotiate and they would be right back where they started. All open discussions of mergers ceased.

In early June Hitler left Munich on an extended trip to Berlin. The anti-Hitler fraction saw their chance to cut the "would-be big shot," as they saw it, down to size.*

In the previous year the party had established a local in Augsburg, a town 35 miles NW of Munich. Some of the "fine" members of the Augsburg local were critical of Hitler and were determined to curb his influence. Working with the Committee in Munich, they resumed negotiations with the German Socialists, but this time in secret. The Committee, headed by Drexler (who was "weak and uncertain" according to Hitler),* empowered the Augsburg local to hold the negotiations on behalf of the party.*   If the merger could be completed in Hitler's absence, he would almost certainly be forced into the position where his enemies wanted him. By the second week of July, negotiations were well under way.

In Berlin, in the meantime, Hitler was spending his time taking advanced lessons in public speaking, establishing ties with other rightist groups and raising money. He addressed the prestigious National Club of industrial figures and upper-class landowners (Junkers) where he tossed about the possibility of transferring his Party headquarters to Berlin. Hitler, however, did all the talking and the Junkers, "who had expected to do all the talking," were forced into the demeaning position of having to listen. The meeting led to nothing.*

Someone in Hitler's inner circle found out about the negotiations in Augsburg and tipped Hitler off. Smelling a rat, Hitler hurried back to Bavaria. He went straight to Augsburg on July 10, and descended on the hall where the negotiations were taking place. He found leading representatives of the German Socialist and his party's Augsburg delegation discussing a prearranged plan which had been worked out in detail.*  By now the German Socialists were negotiating from strength and their aim was no longer a merger but a complete takeover of Hitler's party.*  Their plan basically called for the same conditions that Hitler expected from groups which joined his party. Hitler's National Socialist program as well as the party name was to be abandoned and all members and locals were to accept the name and program of the German Socialists.

After arguing for hours against the proposed plan, Hitler found that the "official representatives of the Party who were present not only did not support me, but on the contrary continued the negotiations."  Unable to accomplish anything in Augsburg, Hitler departed for Munich.

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Footnotes:  (One asterisk is for a footnote, two asterisks are for additional information.)